Abstract. Justification Logic is a family of epistemic logical systems obtained from modal logics of knowledge by adding a new type of formula t:F , which is read t is a justification for F . The principal epistemic modal logic S4 includes Tarski's well-known topological interpretation, according to which the modality 2X is read the Interior of X in a topological space (the topological equivalent of the 'knowable part of X'). In this paper, we extend Tarski's topological interpretation from S4 to Justification Logic systems with both modality and justification assertions. The topological semantics interprets t:X as a reachable subset of X (the topological equivalent of 'test t confirms X'). We establish a number of soundness and completeness results with respect to Kripke topology and the real topology for S4-based systems of Justification Logic.
Introduction
The Justification Logic is a family of logical systems originated from the Logic of Proofs LP (cf. [2, 3, 5, 9, 10] ). These systems are normally obtained from epistemic modal logics by adding new type of formula t : F which is read as t is a justification for F .
The standard provability semantics for LP was given in [2, 3] and it follows Gödel's design from [19] . The epistemic Krike-style semantics for LP was found in [16, 17] and later extended to Justification Logic systems containing both epistemic modalities for 'F is known' and justification assertions 't is a justification for F ' ( [9, 10] ). The major epistemic modal logic S4 has a well-known Tarski's topological interpretation. Such a connection between modal logic and topology proved to be fruitful for both domains. In particular, topology was used in [25] to prove Gödel's conjecture about Gödel's embedding of Intuitionistic Logic to S4. On the other hand, S4-based systems of modal logic have been used to describe the behavior of dynamic systems in real topology (cf. [14] ).
Fundamental connections between modal logic to topology date back to Kuratowski [21] and Riesz in [32] . Let T = X, I
be a topological space, where X is a set and I the interior operation. The following principles hold for all subsets Y and Z of X:
These principles can be presented as propositional modal formulas: settheoretical operations are represented by the corresponding Boolean connectives, and the interior operator I by the modality 2:
These are the postulates of the modal logic S4. This corellation was noticed in the late 1930s by Tarski, Stone, and Tang. Neither Lewis' original approach to modal logic ( [22, 23] ), nor Gödel's provability interpretation of S4 ( [18] ) were related to topology.
Tarski's topological interpretation of propositional modal logic naturally extends the set-theoretical interpretation of classical propositional logic. Given a topological space T = X, I and a valuation (mapping) * of propositional letters to subsets of X, we can extend * to all modal formulas as follows:
A formula A is called valid in T (notation:
is called the modal logic of T . The following classical result in this area is due to McKinsey and Tarski ( [24] ):
Theorem. If S is a separable dense-in-itself metric space, then L(S) = S4.
In particular, for each n = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
Simplified proofs of this theorem were obtained independently in [12, 26, 34] . Kripke models for modal logics can be regarded a special case of topological models. Indeed, given a Kripke frame W, R , one can construct a topological space W, I where
so that validities in these two models are the same. Hence, Kripke-completeness yields the topological completeness. The Justification Logic grew from the Logic of Proofs LP. The first incomplete sketch of the Logic of Proofs was made in Gödel's lecture of 1938 [19] , which remained unpublished until 1995 when the full Logic of Proofs was rediscovered independently in [2] . The Logic of Proofs LP ( [2, 3, 4, 6, 15] ) introduces the notion of proof polynomials, i.e., terms built from proof variables and constants by means of three operations:
• application "·", which given a proof s of an implication F → G and a proof t of its antecedent F provides a proof s · t of the succedent G;
• sum "+", which given proofs s and t returns a proof s + t of everything proven by s or t;
• proof checker "!", which given a proof t of F verifies it and provides a proof !t of the fact that t is indeed a proof of F .
LP is a system with classical logic enriched by additional atoms
t:F
where t is a proof polynomial and F is a formula, with the intended reading t is a proof of F .
As it was shown in [2, 3] , LP describes all valid principles of proof operators t:F t is a proof of F in Peano Arithmetic in its language. The papers [1, 8, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35] studied joint logics of proofs and provability in a format that includes both provability assertions 2F and proof assertions t:F .
In [5, 8, 9, 10] this approach has been extended to epistemic logic and applied for building mathematical models of justification, knowledge and belief. In the epistemic context, proof terms are called justification terms, the set of possible operations on justifications is no longer limited to {·, +, !}, and sentences t:F are interpreted as t is a justification for F .
In particular, [9] introduced and studied the basic epistemic logic with justifications,
Epistemic models for Justification Logics has been developed in [5, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 27] . A Fitting model for S4LP is W, R, A, , where
• A is an admissible evidence function: for each term t and formula F , A(t, F ) is a subset of W . Informally, A(t, F ) specifies a set of worlds where t is an admissible evidence for F . An evidence function is assumed to be monotonic:
and has natural closure properties that agree with operations of S4LP;
• behaves in the standard Kripke style on Boolean connectives and 2:
-u p or u p is specified for each world u and each propositional variable p;
• u t:F iff u 2F and u ∈ A(t, F ).
In [8, 17] , S4LP is shown to be sound and complete with respect to this epistemic semantics.
Topological Semantics for Justifications
We start with offering a topological semantics for operation-free single modality Justification Logics. It means we will work with the usual language of propositional modal logic enriched by a new construction t:F where t is a justification variable and F is a formula.
An interpretation is defined for a topological space T = X, I supplied with a test function M which maps a term t and a formula F to
The informal meaning of M is that M(t, F ) represents a "potentially accessible" region of X associated with F and t.
We assume that an evaluation * maps propositional variables to subsets of X, * works on Boolean connectives and modality 2 according to aforementioned Tarski's interpretation (1). We will study several natural ways to extend * on formulas t:F and corresponding subsystems of S4LP. This approach was first discussed in [11] .
We build our topological semantics for the Justification Logic language on the following formal and informal assumptions.
1. Our semantics is based on Tarski's topological semantics (1), e.g.,
2. Justification terms are symbolic representations of tests. We postulate existence of a test function M which for each t and F specifies a set of points M(t, F ) which we call the set of possible outcomes of a test t of a property F .
3. The t:F will return a set of points where a test t confirms F . This reading will be supported by definitions (for different subsystems of S4LP):
or (t:F )
In case (2), test t supports F at all points where the possible outcome of t lies inside F . Case (3) corresponds to the "robust" understanding of testing: test t supports F at all points of the possible outcome of t which lie in the interior of F .
4. We first consider systems without operations on tests.
Now we introduce several systems of Justification Logic and simultaneously define their topological semantics in format T , M , where T = X, I is a topological space and M is a test function on X.
Basic Testing System S4B 0
The most basic system in our list is
In this system, there are no any assumptions about tests; they don't necessarily produce open sets of outcomes. The only requirement on tests is that the set of values where a test t confirms F is consistent with F itself. A topological model for S4B 0 is a topological space T = X, I with an arbitrary test function M on X, and an evaluation * of propositional letters as subsets of X. Boolean connectives are interpreteted in the usual set-theoretical way, (2F ) * = I(F * ). The definition of the test assertion is as follows:
(t:F )
An S4B 0 -formula is true in a model if it is evaluated as the whole space X. A formula is valid if it is true in every model.
Robust Testing System S4B 1
The next system under consideration is
In S4B 1 -models, test sets are still arbitrary (not necessarily open); however, the test assertions are interpreted as "robust inclusion" (3), i.e. the set of values where test t confirms F is a subset of the interior of F :
Robust Open Testing System S4B 2
Finally, we consider
This system corresponds to the full operation-free version of S4LP. In S4B 2 -models, test sets are open, test assertions are interpreted in the robust sense (3): (t:F )
Topological Soundness and Completeness
Theorem 1. All three systems S4B 0 , S4B 1 , and S4B 2 are sound and complete with respect to the corresponding classes of topological models.
Proof. Soundness of S4B 0 . Since the propositional modal part of S4B 0 has been copied from S4, the soundness of the S4-axioms and rules is checked similarly to those in Tarski's topological interpretation of S4. It remains to check that the only additional axiom of S4B 0 , t:F → F , is S4B 0 -valid. For this, it suffices to check that (t:F ) * ⊆ F * , for each evaluation * , which is immediate from the definition of (t:F ) * = F * ∩ M(t, F ). Soundness of S4B 1 . The same as for S4B 0 , except that now we have to check the validity of t:F → 2F . In S4B 1 -models, (t:F ) * = I(F * ) ∩ M(t, F ) and (2F ) * = I(F * ), hence (t:F ) * ⊆ (2F ) * and (t:F → 2F ) * = X.
Soundness of S4B 2 . The same as before, but now we have to check the validity of both t : F → F and t : F → 2t : F . The former follows from the definition of (t : F ) * as I(F * ) ∩ M(t, F ). To establish the latter, note that in S4B 2 -models, test sets are open, hence each (t:F ) * is open, as the intersection of two open sets I(F * ) and M(t, F ). Therefore, (t:F ) * = I(t:F ) * and (t:F → 2t:F ) * = X.
Completeness proof goes via epistemic models which are then converted into topological spaces with the cone topology.
We consider the case of S4B 2 , the remaining cases are receiving a similar or more simple treatment. Let us first establish the completeness of S4B 2 with respect to Fitting models W, R, A, such that W, R is an S4-frame, A is a monotonic admissible evidence function: for each term t and formula F , u ∈ A(t, F ) and uRv yield v ∈ A(t, F ).
In such models, behaves in the standard Kripke style on Boolean connectives and 2, and u t:F iff u 2F and u ∈ A(t, F ).
Now we describe the canonical Fitting model for S4B 2 by the maximal consistent set construction.
• W is the set of all maximal consistent sets in S4B 2 . We denote elements of W as Γ , ∆, etc.;
Let us check that W, R, A, is indeed an S4B 2 -model. It is immediate from the definitions that the accessibility relation R is reflexive and transitive. In addition, the admissible evidence function A is monotonic. Indeed, suppose Γ ∈ A(t, F ) and Γ R∆. Then t:F ∈ Γ , 2t:F ∈ Γ , 2t:F ∈ ∆, and t:F ∈ ∆, i.e. ∆ ∈ A(t, F ).
Proof. Induction on F . The base case in given in the definition of the canonical model. The Boolean and modality cases are standard.
Let us consider the case when F is t:G. Let t:G ∈ Γ and Γ R∆. Then 2t:G ∈ Γ , 2t:G ∈ ∆, t:G ∈ ∆ (since 2t:G → t : G ∈ ∆), and G ∈ ∆ (since t:G → G ∈ ∆). By the Induction Hypothesis, ∆ G. Furthermore, by the definition of the admissible evidence function, Γ ∈ A(t, G), hence Γ t:G.
Let us now finish the proof of completeness of S4B 2 with respect to S4B 2 -models. Suppose S4B 2 F . Then the set {¬F } is consistent, and hence included into some maximal consistent set Γ . Naturally, F / ∈ Γ . By the Truth Lemma, Γ F . Now we convert a given countermodel K = W, R, A, for F into an appropriate topological space and find an interpretation under which F does To make T K a topological S4B 2 -model it remains to define a test function
for S4B 2 we can also define a topological interpretation * of S4B 2 -language in T K :
Any interpretation * is extended to all S4B 2 -formulas in the standard way:
• (2A) * = I(A * );
From the definitions it is immediate that t:G → G holds in this model. Note that due to monotonicity of the admissible evidence function A, for each t and F , the test sets M(t, G) are open in T K . Therefore t:G → 2t:G also holds at the model.
Proof. Induction on G. The base case when G is atomic is covered by the definition. The Boolean connective case is straightforward. Let G be 2B. Suppose u 2B, then for all v ∈ W such that uRv, v B as well. By the Induction Hypothesis, v ∈ B * for all v ∈ W such that uRv. This yields that the whole open cone O u = {v | uRv} is a subset of B * . Therefore, u ∈ I(B * ) = (2B) * .
Suppose u ∈ (2B) * = I(B * ). Since I(B * ) is open, v ∈ I(B * ) hence v ∈ B * , for all v such that uRv. By the Induction Hypothesis, v B for all v such that uRv. Therefore, u 2B.
Let G be t : B. Suppose u t : B. Then, by definition, u ∈ A(t, B) and v B, for all v such that uRv. By the definition of a test function, u ∈ M(t, B). By the Induction Hypothesis, v ∈ B * for all v such that uRv, which means that u ∈ I(B * ). Hence u ∈ I(B * ) ∩ M(t, B), i.e., u ∈ (t:B) * .
Suppose u ∈ I(B * ) ∩ M(t, B). Then u ∈ M(t, B) hence u ∈ A(t, B). Furthermore, u ∈ I(B * ). Like in the case G = 2B, we conclude that u 2B.
Altogether this yields u t:B. ⊣
To conclude the proof of Theorem 1, consider a Fitting S4B 2 -model, where u F . By the Main Lemma, u / ∈ F * , hence F is not valid in the topological S4B 2 -model T K . ⊣
Completeness with Respect to Real Topology
Theorem 2. S4B 0 , S4B 1 , S4B 2 are complete with respect to the real topology R n .
Proof. We will use the following main lemma from recent refinements of Tarski's Theorem from [12, 26, 34] :
There is an open and continuous map π from (0, 1) onto the Kripke topological space corresponding to a finite rooted Kripke frame. The resulted topological model is a (0, 1)-countermodel for F . This construction yields completeness with respect to the real topology R n , for each n = 1, 2, 3, . . . . ⊣
Future Work
The next natural steps in this direction could be introducing operations on tests. It also looks promising to introduce tests in systems of topological reasoning about knowledge [13] and Dynamic Topological Systems [7, 20] .
